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81-0248

101

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records System Branch, RMD/OIA

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Assistant to the Inspector General

SUBJECT: National Security Classification Guide

1. Enclosed is your preliminary draft of a CIA National Security Classification Guide. I have pencilled in a number of questions and comments about specific items.

2. Concerning the draft Guide itself:

a. Many of the topics, which are listed as unclassified, are classified in themselves. I have circled the (U) at the end of the statement in many cases.

b. Many of the topics are so narrowly defined as to lead an employee to believe that, if the information does not specifically fit the guide item in every respect, then its classifiability is questionable.

c. Some of the review periods are less than the allowable 20 years. It is questionable that we should require review at a shorter period.

d. Some of the classification levels are arbitrary for the general class of information described. This could be artificially and improperly limiting.

e. Major topics are missing from this Guide: medical, security clearance data, collection tasking, intelligence management information, oversight information, intelligence policy, etc., are but a few of the many major topics not touched on at all in this Guide.

f. CIA need not concern itself with justifying the classification of US foreign policy or military data. This is a State, DoD, or DOE responsibility and our protection of this information is based on their standards of classification.

All portions are  
classified SECRET

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3. A classification guide which would "facilitate the proper and uniform classification of information" in the Agency (as required by Para II of [ ] should, in my view, describe what type of information can be released in an unclassified form. Guidance to all employees on this topic is far more important for effective security of Agency equities and capabilities than arcane distinctions between Secret and Confidential or between a 15 or 20 year review period. Why can't the Agency have a classification guide based on the criteria in Annex A of your draft amplifying for each criteria the distinctions between classified and unclassified information.

4. This type of Guide, while addressing the specific EO 12065 requirement for a mandatory review guide, may be the wrong approach to the problem of providing classification guidance to Agency employees. The Agency should take full advantage of its statutory and EO 12065 authorities to protect its information. An entirely different security philosophy should be considered - everything concerning the Agency is classified except that which is specifically declassified.



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Attachments:  
As Stated

8 May 1981

STAT NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]  
Management Staff, DDA.  
SUBJECT: Agency-wide Classification Guide

STAT [REDACTED]

STAT 1. [REDACTED] has raised some questions concerning the portion marking contained in the classification guide published by this Office. The thrust of his comments on whether the Agency needs to publish a classification guide ties in with this memorandum from Chuck Briggs to the A/DCI.


STAT 2. OIS has scheduled a meeting for 19 May to which we have invited representatives from all the Directorates (and some of the Offices) as well as [REDACTED]. The meeting will give [REDACTED] a chance to present his views before the "substantive experts" who have already coordinated on the classification guide during its development. We are ready to circulate the guide for formal coordination, but will delay doing so until after the meeting on 19 May so that we may give [REDACTED] the opportunity to present his views. Consequently, I do not believe that the question of policy guidance from EXCOM on the classification guide is really necessary. We have been working with representatives from all the Directorates and Independent Offices during the entire development of the draft guide as it now exists. All representatives believe that it is a great improvement over what we have worked with heretofore. STAT

STAT 3. If we are unable to "turn off" the classification guide issue as an EXCOM topic, then Tom White as the Director of Information Services would accompany Mr. Fitzwater to the EXCOM meeting in order to make a presentation and answer questions concerning the guide.

4. The only major decision item which might be surfaced at the EXCOM meeting would be whether to have a guide or to abandon this work altogether. The new guide will serve a very useful purpose to CIA. It will replace four guides (one for each Directorate) which were developed by the Directorates for their own use. The DCI Area and IC Staff have no guide and must rely on what-

ever they can glean from the guides of the other Directorates. Thus, the new guide will consolidate the rather haphazard approach taken in the past and provide consistency for classification purposes throughout the Agency. In the view of those who have participated in the guide's development, it will continue to serve a useful purpose in the future regardless of what revisions may ultimately be made to E.O. 12065.





5. Please call me if you have any further questions.



Acting Director of Information Services

STAT

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

|   |          |  |  |
|---|----------|--|--|
| SUBJECT (Optional):   |          |  |  |
| FROM: <br>Acting Chief, Management Staff, DDA<br>7D18 Hqs. |          | EXTENSION:  | NO. <u>015 81-447</u><br>DATE <u>7 MAY 1981</u>  |
| (Other designation, room number, and building)  | DATE     | OFFICER'S INITIALS   | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)  |
|   | RECEIVED | FORWARDED  |  |
| 1. <br>Actg Director, OIS<br>1206 Ams.                     |          |  | <p>Basically, I need to know if this is a viable EXCOM topic, specifics of the presentation (who, when, etc.) and major decision items which might be surfaced.</p> <p>Also, recruitment study is attached for your information as requested.</p>  |
| 2.  |          |  |  |
| 3.  |          |  |  |
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| 14.   |          |  |  |
| 15.   |          |  |  |

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*Available*

6/24/98



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81-0243

21 April 1981

Executive Registry

81-7086

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles A. Briggs  
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Briggs' Corollary to Murphy's Law

1. The explanation of subject, well known to my colleagues who deal with FOIA and declassification matters is: "If there is even the remotest chance that we can shoot ourselves in the foot, not only will we, but we will be intent upon it."

2. The Agency has underway an effort which I have to support in principle, namely, development of an Agency-wide National Security Classification Guide. However, efforts to date reflect an in-house schizophrenia re current tactics. The CIA Act of 1949 allows us to withhold any budget data, employee names or organizational details. The FOIA, Privacy Act and executive orders on classification have allowed various exemptions which, in our implementing documents, we chose to apply only in part -- for tactical reasons -- while we were re-gaining our credibility.

3. Having been lucky enough to have signed a great many affidavits, denying information in FOIA/PA cases, I am keenly aware of the need to avoid arbitrary and capricious actions; I also believe it is time to staunch hemorrhaging.

4. Dating back to the Schlesinger era, we have considered DDI (NFAC), DDA and DDS&T organization titles, and most employees in NEAC and S&T, overt, therefore information about them, including their names, releasable. We have released internal CIA regulations, even Community security procedures manuals, because they were considered unclassified. The current draft of the Agency-wide National Security Classification Guide has line items, individually called Unclassified, which discuss methodology, which, along with source protection, is also classifiable -- or at least controllable as to dissemination. I submit that we can be smarter than this.

ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

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5. I suggest that the compilation of a clear and concise in-house Guide continue, to permit desirable cross-directorate consistency but that the drafters get some current policy guidance. I've discussed this in general with the DDA, who agrees with the principle. I suggest that ExCom address the classification/control issue.

*Count*

[Redacted Signature]

Charles A. Briggs

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Approved For Release 2005/12/01 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001200030007-9

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NO:

ISSUED TO:

NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE



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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sactions

WARNING NOTICE  
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

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Approved For Release 2005/12/01 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001200030007-9

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (U)

FOREWORD

- References:
- A. Executive Order 12065
  - B. Directive No. 1, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)
  - C. Headquarters Handbook  (U)

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The CIA National Security Classification Guide has been prepared in accordance with the requirements and criteria set fourth in references. It is approved for use upon publication by all Agency personnel authorized to classify national security information. The four existing Directorate classification guides issued during November 1978 are rescinded effective 1 July 1981 and should be destroyed at that time. (U)

Frank C. Carlucci  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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All portions on this page are unclassified

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THE GUIDE AND ITS USE (U)

I. GENERAL (U)

The CIA National Security Classification Guide (NSCG) is arranged alphabetically by subject (see Table of Contents) and establishes uniform classification durations for frequently reoccurring items of national security information [REDACTED]

ILLEGIB

[REDACTED] by the Director of Central Intelligence. (U)

Citing the NSCG is known [REDACTED] and the classification level and duration specified [REDACTED]

ILLEGIB

ILLEGIB

[REDACTED] The classification duration of documents or materials classified under the authority of the NSCG will begin with the date of the origination of the document or material being classified.<sup>1</sup> (U)

<sup>1</sup>When derivatively classifying from a document other than a classification guide, the date or event for review or declassification must be carried forward from the source document to the document you are classifying. (U)

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II. AUTHORITY TO CITE THE GUIDE (U)

Authorized NSCG users are:

-Personnel who have or are occupying positions which have Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential national security classification authority (also known as "original" classification authority) and

-Personnel who have or are occupying positions which have derivative national security classification authority. (U)

A listing of all authorized users is maintained by the Office of Information Services, Records Management Division, Records Systems Branch.

All users must be approved by Operating Officials or high<sup>er</sup> level officials who also have Top Secret classification authority (see  for additional details). (U)

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## COMMUNICATIONS

COM

|          |  | LEVEL  | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|--|--|----------------|------------------------|
| COM 1-80 | Cryptographic keying material which secures communications circuits used for the transmission of classified information. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A,A1;WALSH)             | Classify at highest level of traffic it is intended to protect.<br>(Normally TS) | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| COM 2-80 | Information revealing the implementation or supersession date of a specific edition or a single item of cryptological keying material. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A,D1a&2a) | C  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| COM 3-80 | The length of the cryptoperiod of a general or specific machine cryptosystem or manual system including command and control. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A,D4)               | C  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| COM 4-80 | Information which reveals cryptoperiod dates. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A,D2c)   | S  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| COM 5-80 | Status information pertaining to a single sealed authenticator for use in command and control. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A,D2b)  | S  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| COM 6-80 | An operational Card Reader Insert Board (CRIB). (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A,A3)  | S  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |

Changed to (U/FOUO)  
Cited from H. H. Guide

Why unclassified?

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COMMUNICATIONS


COM

|            |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|------------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| COM 7-80   | Information revealing the operational life span of a Card Reader Insert Board. (U) <i>FOUO</i>  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| * COM 8-80 | Detailed concepts and procedures for crypto-variable up-dating, cryptovvariable generation, and techniques for remote keying of a crypto-equipment. (U) <i>changed to (C)</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, B2e)   | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| COM 9-80   | Filled in operational key card book covers and key list certificates of use. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, D2d)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| COM 10-80  | Inventory reports of COMSEC materials containing:<br>(1) a substantially complete listing of keying material or<br>(2) a substantially complete inventory of a specific COMSEC equipment held by CIA or<br>(3) a substantially complete inventory of all COMSEC equipment held by CIA. (U)<br>(NACSI 3004A, G3a(3), c(1)&(2)) | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| COM 11-80  | Information concerning one or more elements of the CIA's worldwide electronic communications network which, if divulged, reasonably could be expected to provide procedural or capability data <del>etc.</del> to determine a potential communications vulnerability. (U)<br>(A9c2.1) <i>that could be used</i>               | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5           |

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COMMUNICATIONS

COM

|           |  | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|--|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| COM 12-80 | Information concerning the CIA's worldwide electronic communications network which, if divulged, would provide procedural or capability data that identifies a potential communications vulnerability. (U) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(5)         |
| COM 13-80 |   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COM 14-80 |  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |

*why unclassified?*

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CON

CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS

CON 1-80

LEVEL

DURATION

CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION

10 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B(3&5)

CON 2-80

10 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B(3&5)

ILLEGIB

CON 3-80

Information pertaining to a contractual relationship or arrangement to provide logistical support to the CIA which, if divulged, would tend to nullify, impede, or otherwise jeopardize intelligence operations. (U) (A9c2.6)

S

(10)  
7 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B(3&5)

CON 4-80

Information pertaining to a covert procurement. (U) (AISM 30; HR 7-1; A9c2.9)

S

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B(3&5)

CON 5-80

Information relating to a CIA contractual relationship which, if divulged, could reveal a covert intelligence interest, the extent of a knowledge or expertise possessed by the CIA, or adversely affect the contractor's willingness or ability to provide services to the CIA. (U) (AISM 26)

S

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B(3&5)

SECRET

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COVER

COV

|               | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|---------------|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| 25X1 COV 1-80 | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 2-80      | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 3-80      | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 4-80      | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 5-80      | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 6-80      | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |

Information which tends to identify and associate a currently overt employee with the CIA during a period the employee was under cover and whose CIA employment during that period has been blocked. (U) *only under info of*

Information which tends to identify a U.S. Government organization (excluding CIA components) and reveal that it provides, or provided, cover or support for cover. (U) *FOUO*

Information which tends to identify and associate with the CIA an employee who is under official cover but which does not reveal the cover organization. (U) *FOUO*

Information which tends to identify and associate with the CIA an employee who is under official cover but who was previously under cover in a non-official organization which is no longer used and which does not name either cover organization. (U) *why under info of ?*

Information which tends to identify and associate with the CIA an employee who is now under official cover but who was previously under cover in a non-official organization which is still being used - regardless of whether either cover organization is named. (U) *FOUO*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

COVER

COV

|           |   | LEVEL   | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|---------|----------------|------------------------|
| COV 7-80  | Information which tends to identify and associate a CIA employee with the CIA and the employee's official or non-official cover organization. (U) FOUO  | S       | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 8-80  | Information which tends to identify a non-official organization and that it provides, or provided, cover or support for cover. (U) FOUO   | S       | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 9-80  | Information which tends to identify and associate with the CIA an employee who is, or is expected to be, under a non-official cover organization - regardless of whether the cover organization is named. (U) FOUO why unclassified | S       | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 10-80 | Information which tends to reveal the methods used by the CIA to establish, maintain, use, or terminate official or non-official cover. (U) FOUO why unclassified   | S       | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| COV 11-80 | Information that reveals or suggests that a specific function of another Government agency is in fact carried out by the CIA. (U) FOUO (B9c2.6)   | (C) (S) | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |

why unclassified

Typed Secret on top Secret information?

**SECRET**



ILLEGIB

**SECRET**

DEFECTORS

DEF

|          |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| DEF 1-80 | Information associating a defector with the Intelligence Community, which, if divulged, would tend to reveal the knowledge or capability gained from such association. (U) (AISM 16)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| DEF 2-80 | Information concerning the identity or location of a defector for whom the Intelligence Community is responsible which, if divulged, could place the defector in jeopardy or otherwise discourage other individuals from defection. (U) (AISM 19) | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3,5, & 8)  |
| DEF 3-80 | Information which would tend to reveal the identity of an individual who has defected in place. (U)   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3,5, & 8)  |
| DEF 4-80 |   |       | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| DEF 5-80 |   |       | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3,5, & 8)  |

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ECONOMICS

*why limit to 10 yrs. review?  
= intelligence methods.*

ECO

|          |  | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|--|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| ECO 1-80 | Information which reveals an Agency analysis of a current economic policy alternative open to a foreign government. (U) (B9c8.1)   | C     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5       |
| ECO 2-80 | Economic information in which the analytical method (procedure) involved is the property of a foreign state or quasi-national entity and has not been formally offered for sale or exchange to the U.S. (C) (B9c1.6) | C     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs A(c,d,e) & B(3&5) |
| ECO 3-80 | Economic information, not in the public domain, which presents an assessment or estimate of the costs of a foreign defense system or activity. (U) (B9c2.7)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5       |
| ECO 4-80 | Information, not in the public domain, pertaining to such foreign economic planning data as pricing practices, defense industry organization, production technology, etc. (U) (B9c2.9)                               | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5       |

*Why not classify economic intelligence analytic methods in general?*

**SECRET**

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EQUIPMENT

EQU

*Why undeclassified?*

*Why not in COMSEC Section?*

|          |   | LEVEL                   | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|---|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| EQU 1-80 | Diagnostic checks, or specific details and parameters, of computer crypto-algorithms. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, c3&5)  | C                       | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 2-80 | A randomizer itself or documentation which reveals the complete design of a randomizer. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, B7)  | C                       | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 3-80 | Information which reveals the exact length or number of cryptovariables for a specific equipment or computer crypto-algorithm. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, B2c & C4)   | C                       | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 4-80 | The fact that a particular crypto-equipment uses a Card Reader Insert Board (CRIB). (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, B3)  | C                       | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B4           |
| EQU 5-80 | The fact that a crypto-equipment has an anti-jam, anti-spoof, anti-depth, or low probability of intercept capability. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, A6)  | C                       | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B4           |
| EQU 6-80 | Information revealing a specific component or circuit within a specific equipment which is designed to protect against a security fault deficiency. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, F14)                             | S                       | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 7-80 | Input-output characteristics of crypto-equipment when associated with a specific interface equipment and when indicative of its rules of motion, function, or internal activity. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, B1) | Same<br>as<br>equipment | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |

*all new B-1*

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EQU

**EQUIPMENT**

|           |   | LEVEL   | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|---|-------------------|------------------------|
| EQU 8-80  | Details of crypto-alarms. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, B2(d))   | Same<br>as<br>equipment<br>cryptographic<br>logic | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 9-80  | Information which reveals the association<br>of a specific crypto-principle or method<br>which reflects key generation techniques<br>with a given equipment. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, B1a)  | Same<br>as<br>equipment<br>cryptographic<br>logic | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 10-80 | Specific cryptographic logic details and<br>parameters of an equipment including rule<br>of motion, combining logic details, length<br>and number of key generating registers, and<br>number of combining triangles. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, B2b(1)-(4))                                   | Same<br>as<br>equipment<br>cryptographic<br>logic | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 11-80 | Information, including photomasters, drawings,<br>etched boards, and diagnostic test routines<br>of a classified COMSEC equipment or component,<br>if the information reveals the same as may<br>be obtained from an examination of the complete<br>component. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, B5) | Same<br>as<br>equipment<br>cryptographic<br>logic | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 12-80 | The statement, giving details, that a specific<br>equipment (in its preproduction phases of development)<br>contains security fault deficiencies. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, F12)   | S   | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |


*Why unclassified?*

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EQU

**EQUIPMENT**


|           |  | LEVEL | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|--|-------|-------------------|------------------------|
| EQU 13-80 | Specific details and parameters of computer crypto-algorithms in or related to development contracts documentation. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, C3)   | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B4       |
| EQU 14-80 | Information concerning antiterrorism or sabotage equipment, and the manner in which it is employed, the disclosure of which would facilitate the creation of a countering equipment or method. (U)<br>(C9c2.2)   | C     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| EQU 15-80 | Information which would tend to associate equipment such as nonattributable vehicles, tape recorders, cameras, communication devices, etc., with the CIA and which, if identified as belonging to the CIA, could compromise a covert Agency activity or an individual operating in a covert capacity (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(A9c3.5) | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| EQU 16-80 |   | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| EQU 17-80 |  | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |

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EQU

**EQUIPMENT**

|           |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| EQU 18-80 | Information concerning staff and agent equipment aids such as concealment devices, equipment for tracking and locating persons, weapons caches, etc., surreptitious entry devices, devices to provide physical security, and devices to detect and defeat technical surveillance which, if disclosed, would impair or negate the use of the aids. (U) (C9c1.12) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| EQU 19-80 |   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| EQU 20-80 |   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| EQU 21-80 | Comprehensive information concerning the National Surveillance Technical Systems; such as that contained in technical and operational manuals or studies describing techniques, procedures, and modes of operation; which, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to impair or negate a technical or intelligence advantage. (U) (C9c2.5)                   | TS    | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |

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EQUIPMENT

EQU

*Why not 20 yrs. review?*

EQU 22-80

Information concerning the research and development of an equipment or technique for intelligence use which, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to impair or negate its eventual use. (U)

| LEVEL  | DURATION                    | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| Classify in accordance with the level and duration specified for a comparable equipment or technique as specified elsewhere in this guide (cite the other item) or Confidential under EQU 22-80. | 10 yrs. review<br>(15 yrs.) | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |

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FIN

*why not a general classification on Agency financial policies, procedures, transactions and data?*

|                  |  | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION  |
|------------------|--|-------|----------------|-------------------------|
| FIN 1-80         | Information concerning a specific expenditure which, if divulged, would tend to reveal a covert intelligence objective, capability, or procedure. (U)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3            |
| FIN 2-80         | Information dealing with budget, expenditures, funding or other fiscal aspects which could reveal activities conducted, or to be conducted, abroad in support of nonattributable national foreign policy objectives. (U)<br>(A9d5.1) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&d) & B(3,5,&7) |
| FIN 3-80         | Budgeting data on a specific intelligence objective or an intelligence program which would reveal the amount of effort being committed to that objective or program. (U)<br>(C9c3.1)   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)        |
| 25X1<br>FIN 4-80 |  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&d) & B3        |
| FIN 5-80         | Information concerning the CIA's Contingency Fund such as the source of the fund or the amount or purpose for which any portion of it is released. (C)<br>(AISM 35; A9c3.3)  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3            |
| FIN 6-80         | Information concerning the procedures or techniques used in the dispersal of funds as the result of agreements with the Department of Treasury or the Office of Management and Budget. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(AISM 33)                  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3            |



*why not classify?*

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*FIN*

FINANCE

|      |          | LEVEL   | DURATION | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION         |
|------|----------|---|----------|--------------------------------|
| 25X1 | FIN 7-80 |  |          | S 20 yrs. review Tabs Ac & B3  |
|      | FIN 8-80 | The monthly CIA Statement of Financial Condition. (U)                               |          | S 20 yrs. review Tabs Ac & B3  |
| 25X1 | FIN 9-80 |  |          | TS 20 yrs. review Tabs Ac & B3 |

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*why not classify?*

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**SECRET***WHY not classify intelligence methods?*

FOREIGN RELATIONS

FOR

|          |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| FOR 1-80 | An Agency analysis of a political, economic, industrial, or technological policy alternative open to a foreign government which, if released, would negate a potential foreign policy approach. (U) (B9c8.1)  | C     | 7 yrs. review  | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 2-80 | Information, not in the public domain, that might lead a foreign country or political or terrorist movement to believe that the U.S., or any nation allied or friendly with the U.S., is preparing to undertake political, economic, or military action against them or their allies - regardless of whether it is true. (U) (B9d1.1) | S     | 7 yrs. review  | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 3-80 | Information, not in the public domain, that reveals plans by the U.S., or any nation allied or friendly with the U.S., to provide aid to a foreign entity that poses a threat to another foreign entity, or that reveals the existence of such aid. (U) (B9d1.2)  | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 4-80 | Information, not in the public domain, that tends to disparage a foreign nation, an international organization of governments, a foreign group playing a significant role in international affairs, or major elements of any of these entities. (U) (B9d2.1)  | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 5-80 | Information that a foreign nation, or individual of influence in a foreign nation, might consider embarrassing and thereby negatively affect the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. (U) (B9d2.3)   | C     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |

*- This is  
S-6 on DOD  
problem?***SECRET**

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## FOREIGN RELATIONS

FOR

|           |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| FOR 6-80  | Information, not in the public domain, that a foreign nation might interpret as an indication that the U.S. is or has interfered in its internal affairs or that could be used in a policy conflict or political contest in a foreign country in support or derogation of one side or another. (U) (B9d2.4) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 7-80  | Information (even if based on unclassified material) that, because of the manner in which it is presented, could be construed as representing an official view of the U.S. Government -- when such a view has not been acknowledged. (U) (B9d2.8)   | C     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 8-80  | Information that is intended to be used in discussions or negotiations with a foreign nation or that may serve as background data in those discussions or negotiations. (U) (B9d3.1)  | C     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 9-80  | Information that reveals, or tends to reveal, specific U.S. policy interests, options, concerns, or considerations which, if released, could negatively impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. (U) (B9d4.1)  | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| FOR 10-80 | Information based on public media or other overt sources which, by the fact of collection, indicates a general foreign policy or intelligence interest not officially acknowledged and which, if disclosed, could impair the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. (U) (C9d2.1)                                | C     | 6 months       | Tab Ad                 |

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## HUMAN ASSETS

|          |  | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|--|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| HUM 1-80 | Information that could lead to the identification of an individual as a prospective asset and which, if divulged, would preclude the use or cooperation of that individual. (U)<br>(B9c1.1)  | C     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| HUM 2-80 | Information that could lead to the identification of an individual who has provided non-substantive information or cooperation with the understanding that the person's identity would be held in confidence and which, if divulged, could place the person in jeopardy or would otherwise tend to discourage other individuals from providing information or cooperation. (U) | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B8           |
| HUM 3-80 | Information that could lead to the identification of an individual who has assisted in endeavors aimed at countering terrorism or illicit narcotics activity which, if divulged, could negate or impede the effectiveness of present or future countering endeavors. (U)<br>(AISM 7)   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| HUM 4-80 | Information that could lead to the identification of an individual who has assisted in a covert action program designed to influence events abroad and which, if divulged, would tend to negate the effectiveness of the program. (U)<br>(AISM 7)  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&d) & B(3&5)   |

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## HUMAN ASSETS

HUM

|          |  | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|--|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| HUM 5-80 | Information concerning the identity of a human source of current intelligence or counterintelligence information which, if divulged, could negate or impede the capability to obtain such information in any manner--including the possibility of placing the person in jeopardy. (U)                      | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(365)       |
| HUM 6-80 | Information concerning the identity of a human source which, if divulged, would reveal capability data that would permit an evaluation of the effectiveness or comprehensiveness of U.S. intelligence or counter-intelligence efforts and which would significantly reduce the value of those efforts. (U) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & BS           |

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LIAISON-FOREIGN  
(FOREIGN GOVERNMENT)

LIA

|          |   | LEVEL  | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION          |
|----------|---|--|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| LIA 1-80 | Information provided to the U.S. by any element of a foreign government, or international organization of governments, with the explicit or implicit understanding that the information is to be kept in confidence. (U)<br>(A9b1,3.5,3.6,3.8,D9b.1)                | (1) Classification level as specified by foreign government.<br>(2) If not so specified, classify as Secret that information which would tend to identify the originator/provider or which the originator/provider would likely recognize as having been provided to the U.S. (3) Otherwise, classify Confidential or (4) according to content as specified elsewhere in this guide. | 30 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(b&d) &<br>B(1,3,& 7)     |
| LIA 2-80 | Information produced by the U.S., whether unilaterally or jointly with a foreign government or international organization of governments, pursuant to a written agreement that requires that the information or the agreement be kept in confidence. (U)<br>(D9b.2) | Secret unless specified otherwise.   | 30 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(b,c,& d) &<br>B(1,3,& 7) |

# SECRET

# SECRET

LIAISON-FOREIGN  
(FOREIGN GOVERNMENT)

LIA

|          |   | LEVEL                                | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION        |
|----------|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| LIA 3-80 | Information concerning intelligence cooperation, including intelligence support, between the U.S. and a specific governmental component in an Allied country, or description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and any Allied country. (U)<br>(DCID 1/10; A9b3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.7, 3.9; D9b.3) | Secret unless specified otherwise. ↓ | 30 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(b,c,&d) &<br>B(1,3,&7) |
| LIA 4-80 | Information concerning intelligence cooperation, <i>including intelligence support</i> , between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the U.S. is not allied. (U)<br>(DCID 1/10; D9b.3)   | S                                    | 30 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(b,c,&d) &<br>B(1,3,&7) |
| LIA 5-80 | Information concerning the identities of foreign government or military personnel who provide or receive intelligence cooperation with the knowledge of their government. (U)<br>(DCID 1/10; A9b.3.2)   | S                                    | 30 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(b,c,&d) &<br>B(1,3,&7) |

# SECRET

**SECRET**

## LOCATIONS

LOC

25X1

LOC 1-80

LEVEL

DURATION

CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION

C

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac &amp; B3

LOC 2-80

Information concerning the location of an installation (other than as described in LOC 5-80) in an allied or friendly foreign country which, if divulged, would tend to embarrass the host government or otherwise detract from intelligence collection or covert capabilities. (FBIS locations are not classified.) (U) ~~FOUO~~

C

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac &amp; B3

LOC 3-80

Information concerning the location of an installation in a neutral or hostile foreign country which, if divulged, would tend to negate, impede, or detract from intelligence collection or other covert capabilities. (U) ~~FOUO~~

S

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac &amp; B3

LOC 4-80

Information concerning the location of an installation, such as a safehouse, which has a facility cover which is not an element of the U.S. Government. (U) ~~FOUO~~ (A9c2.14)

S

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac &amp; B3

LOC 5-80

Information concerning the location of an electronic emission gathering or major communications relay installation which, if divulged, would tend to negate, impede, or detract from collection capability or would provide targetting data useful to an adversary in the advent of armed hostilities. (U) (C9c1.6)

S

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac &amp; B3

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

METHODS - GENERAL

*Classify all intelligence!* <sup>MET</sup>

*Cell Method*

MET 1-80

A code designation which indicates action, routing, control, or sensitivity when used in such a manner as to potentially compromise its meaning. (These designations alone or without amplifying data are not classified.) (U) (A9c4.1)

LEVEL

DURATION

CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION

C

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B3

MET 2-80

A code designation such as a slug, cryptonym, pseudonym, or alias when used in such a manner as to potentially compromise its meaning. (These designations alone or without amplifying data are not classified.) (U) (A9c4.1)

Confidential 20 yrs.  
under this review  
item or  
classify in  
accordance  
with the  
information  
revealed as  
specified  
elsewhere  
in this guide.  
and cite the  
other item.

Tabs Ac & B3

MET 3-80

A list of 3 or more MET 2-80 code designations used for a particular area, denomination, function, activity or personnel involved in an activity.

C

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B3

MET 4-80

Information pertaining to covert training techniques, training in intelligence or counterintelligence methodology, unique to the Agency, or training priorities which reveal Agency weaknesses or lack of capability. (Training in the use of a technical system, such as one used for communication, collection, or security, is classified in accordance with the information revealed as specified elsewhere in this guide.) (U) (A9c2.27)

C

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B3

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

METHODS - GENERAL

*why not classified?***MET**

|           |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION     |
|-----------|---|-------|----------------|----------------------------|
| MET 5-80  | Information concerning covert real property acquisition procedures (U) (A9c2.10)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3               |
| MET 6-80  | Information concerning sterile acquisition procedures. (U) (A9c2.12)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3               |
| MET 7-80  | Information concerning the methods used to acquire, maintain, or dispose of a particular safesite. (U) (A9c2.14)  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3               |
| MET 8-80  | Information concerning the methods used to acquire, ship, or store weapons or ordnance for operational activity. (U) (A9c2.14)  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3               |
| MET 9-80  | Information concerning a device or method, such as alias or fictitious documentation or personal disguise, used to conceal the identity of a human asset. (U) (C9c1.12)   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3               |
| MET 10-80 | Information; such as the organization, location, mission, or support activities; which would tend to compromise staybehind agent networks. (FOUO) (A9c3.13)   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3               |
| MET 11-80 | The fact of the use of a health or personality assessment in the support or conduct of specific foreign relations or as the method of collection of related information. (FOUO) (B9c2.14.2)   | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c or d) & B3        |
| MET 12-80 | An assessment of the health, personality, or political behavior of a foreign leader (or leadership group) which, if divulged, would tend to provide insight into operational or foreign relations approaches. (FOUO) (B9c1.4,1.5;A9c2.16) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c or d) & B(3 or 7) |

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

METHODS - GENERAL

*MET*

|           |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| MET 13-80 | Information on a direct or indirect psychological assessment of an agent or an individual of intelligence interest, including any graphological assessment. (FOUO)/U (C9c1.15)  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| MET 14-80 | Information pertaining to a psychobiographic assessment of (1) a key foreign official, (2) in a nation with which the U.S. has an economic or military relationship vital to the national security, and (3) which could be interpreted as being derogatory. U/(FOUO) (A9c2.16)  | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ad & B7           |
| MET 15-80 | Unique computer simulations, special application programs, or models of actual events used to postulate, assess, or compare U.S. and foreign capabilities or vulnerabilities, based on the past, present, or projected behavior of military, economic, political, or physical systems, events, or activities. U/(FOUO) (B9a4.5)   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B3       |
| MET 16-80 | Information describing unique methodologies such as those used to:<br>(1) estimate the costs of foreign defense activities,<br>(2) produce foreign cartographic, geographic, or environmental intelligence, or<br>(3) produce cultural and cross-cultural idiosyncrasies of foreign nations or peoples. U/(FOUO) (B9c7.5, 46, 47) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| MET 17-80 | Information concerning the criteria or procedures established S by the National Level Watch Centers disclosing agreed upon actions to be taken upon the receipt of critical intelligence or in a crises management situation. (U) (B9c9.1)  | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |

*Dissemination!*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

METHODS - GENERAL

*MET*

|           |  | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|--|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| MET 18-80 | Analytical methodologies and techniques used in assessing the impact of natural resources, science and technology development, and food and population factors on foreign military, political, and economic capabilities and likely responses. U/(FOUO) (B9e2.5; C9e3.5) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B3       |
| MET 19-80 | Exploratory research for the purpose of developing analytical methodologies to be used to extract intelligence information. (U) (C9a1.1)   | S     | 15 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B3       |
| MET 20-80 | Exploratory research for the purpose of developing methodologies or techniques to be used to present intelligence information in such a way as to disguise the means of acquisition. (U) (C9a1.2)  | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B3       |
| MET 21-80 | Information concerning unique document reproduction or a specialized graphic art technique, which if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to lead to the compromise of a covert intelligence activity. (U) (C9c2.3)   | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| MET 22-80 | Information concerning the Agency's unique paper or plastic making capabilities which, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to lead to the compromise of a covert intelligence activity. U/(FOUO) (C9c2.4)   | S     | 10 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| MET 23-80 | Information concerning the special techniques (including research and development data) used in the mensuration of satellite photography which, if divulged, would reveal capability data not in the public domain. U/(FOUO) (C9e2.12)                                   | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |

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**SECRET**



**SECRET**

*MET*

METHODS - GENERAL

|           |  | LEVEL | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|--|-------|-------------------|------------------------|
| MET 24-80 | Information revealing the specific analytic methods or techniques used to extract or otherwise exploit compromising emanations related to obtaining information concerning keying variables. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, 8F2b) <i>Classified</i> !        | TS    | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| MET 25-80 | Information revealing the specific analytic methods or techniques used to extract information or otherwise exploit compromising emanations when related to the recovery of plain text or final key. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, 8F2a) <i>Classified</i> ! | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |
| MET 26-80 | Information revealing newly discovered or certain special techniques for the interception or analysis of compromising emanations or TEMPEST testing (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, 8F3) <i>Classified</i> !  | TS    | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(3&5)   |

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**SECRET**

*Why is CIA concerned with the classification of US military data? MIL*

*MILITARY*

|  | LEVEL | DURATION   | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION  |
|--|-------|--|-------------------------|
| MIL 1-80<br>Information concerning the military strengths and vulnerabilities of the U.S. (or those nations with which the U.S. has substantive interdependent relationships) which would provide insight as to how to develop superior or offsetting capabilities. (U) (B9a3.1/4.1)   | S     | 15 yrs. review   | Tabs A(a&d) & B6        |
| MIL 2-80<br>Information concerning the military defense plans or posture of the U.S. (or those nations with which the U.S. has substantive interdependent relationships) and which would aid in the development of countermeasures to such plans or posture. (U) (D9a.3)   | S     | 15 yrs. review   | Tabs A(a&d) & B6        |
| MIL 3-80<br>Information concerning national and military command, control and communications systems, nuclear weapon release authority and agreements, or other types of information which would give an indication or warning that the U.S. or its allies was preparing to attack and which would permit the development of countermeasures to the attack. (U) (B9a4.2) | TS    | 20 yrs. review<br>(15)<br>10 yrs. downgrade to S           | Tabs A(a&d) & B6        |
| MIL 4-80<br>Information concerning activities which are possible precursors to the involvement of the U.S. in armed conflict and which, if divulged, would negatively impact on the U.S. capability to respond to those activities. (U) (New)  | TS    | (10)<br>7 yrs. review<br><br>5 yrs. downgrade to S<br>(20) | Tabs A(a&d) & B(6 or 7) |
| MIL 5-80<br>The costing of foreign military capabilities or activities in U.S. terms. (U) (NFAC)   | S     | (20)<br>15 yrs. review                                     | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)        |

*Why? Change is slow!*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

MILITARY

*could be TS!*

*if hydro? appears?*

|   | LEVEL | DURATION   | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|---|-------|--|------------------------|
| MIL 6-80<br>Information concerning an in-depth scientific or engineering analysis of a foreign weapons system or major subsystem. (U)<br>(NFAC)   | (S)   | (20)<br>15 yrs.<br>review  | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| MIL 7-80<br>Information concerning the strategic or defense plans, intentions, capabilities, or activities of a nation capable of posing a military threat to the U.S. (or those nations with which the U.S. has substantive interdependent relationships) and which impacts upon that threat. (U)<br>(B9a1.1/1.5/2.2/3.2) (C9a1.4) (D9a.1)   | (S)   | (20)<br>15 yrs.<br>review  | Tabs Aa & B6           |
| MIL 8-80<br>Assessments, such as those that may be contained in National Intelligence Estimates, that represent the judgment of the U.S. Intelligence Community regarding foreign military intentions, plans, capabilities, or activities posing a potential threat to the U.S. or its allies which, if revealed, would negate significant aspects of U.S. defense or strategic planning. (U)<br>(B9a1.6) | TS    | (20)<br>15 yrs.<br>review<br>(10)<br>5 yrs.<br>downgrade<br>to S | Tabs Aa & B6           |
| MIL 9-80<br>Information concerning the existence of a suspected covert foreign capability that has, or could have, the potential to substantively alter the world balance of power. (U)<br>(C9a1.3)   | TS    | (20)<br>15 yrs.<br>review<br>(10)<br>5 yrs.<br>downgrade<br>to S | Tabs Aa & B6           |

*could be TS?*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

MISCELLANEOUS

MIS

|          |  | LEVEL  | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION             |
|----------|--|--|----------------|------------------------------------|
| MIS 1-80 | Individually unclassified items which in the aggregate reveal a system, objective, requirement, or other aspect of the CIA or its mission, the disclosure of which would provide vulnerability or capability data. (U)     | Classify the aggregate Confidential; the individual items remain unclassified. | 10 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3 or 5)                |
| MIS 2-80 | Information, such as that contained in logs or a series of records request forms, that tends to reveal Agency interests and the personnel and offices primarily responsible for a subject of interest. (U)                 | (C)  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3                       |
| MIS 3-80 | Information, such as that contained in Publication Source Survey reports, which provides identifying data on the source of a finished intelligence project. (U)  | S  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B3                       |
| MIS 4-80 | Information on segments of a large-scale, high-cost, intelligence program or non-system related program such as would be contained in an interface control document, a users manual, or an ADP concept paper. (U) (C9c7.2) | TS<br>SIS  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5                   |
| MIS 5-80 | Detailed information on a large-scale, high-cost intelligence program such as would be revealed by a model or computer simulation. (U) (C9c7.1;7.3)  | TS<br>S  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5                   |
| MIS 6-80 | Information that could reveal vulnerabilities of the U.S. or foreign nuclear facilities or programs for safeguarding. (U) (C9f1.1)   | TS   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(f or c or b) B(2 or 5 or 7) |


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PERSONNEL/ORGANIZATION

|   | LEVEL    | DURATION        | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION                 |
|---|----------|-----------------|--|
| PER 1-80<br>Information pertaining to the identity of an applicant who may be placed under cover. (U) <i>Does this mean ALL APPLICANTS?</i><br>(A9c12.1)  | (C)      | (7 yrs. review) | Tabs Ac & B3<br><i>why not 20 yrs?</i> |
| PER 2-80<br>Information concerning the recruitment policy, assessments, selection, or evaluation of personnel or applicants which, if divulged, would tend to reveal the extent of effort dedicated to achieve an intelligence objective or would provide an advantage to a potential penetration of the CIA.<br>(U)<br>(A9c12.4) | S        | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B5                           |
| PER 3-80<br>Information concerning the policy and procedures for recruitment, assessment, selection, and evaluation of personnel for special training programs which, if divulged, would reveal a covert relationship or a covert Agency interest or objective.<br>(U)<br>(A9c12.5)   | S        | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B(3 or 5)                    |
| PER 4-80<br>Information which substantively reveals the number of personnel employed within the CIA's clandestine service.<br>(U) <i>deriving? why not for CIA as a whole?</i>  | (S)<br>C | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B5                           |
| PER 5-80<br>Information which substantively reveals the number of personnel employed by the CIA <i>on the components.</i><br>(U)  | (S)<br>C | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B5                           |
| PER 6-80<br>Information which substantively reveals the number of personnel employed within or devoted to a specific intelligence unit or program which, if divulged, would tend to reveal the amount of effort dedicated to an intelligence objective or geographical area. (U)<br>(C9c1.4) <i>why not CI and CA?</i>            | S        | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)                       |

**SECRET**

## PERSONNEL/ORGANIZATION

|           |   | LEVEL | DURATION                  | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|-------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| PER 7-80  | Information which substantively reveals the numbers of personnel in particular grades, assignments, or with particular skills which, if divulged, would tend to reveal the effort being dedicated to achieve an intelligence objective. (U)<br>(A9c3.17)  | S     | 15 yrs.<br>10 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| PER 8-80  | Information concerning the covert operational or support relationship of a CIA element or personnel with another Government agency. (FOUO) <i>clarify!</i>  | S     | 20 yrs. review            | Tabs Ac & B(3&5)       |
| PER 9-80  | A substantially complete list of personnel within a component which has a classified title. (See PER 11-80 for a definition.) (U) <i>why limit to classified titles.</i>  | S     | 20 yrs. review            | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| PER 10-80 | A substantially complete list of personnel within a component C which (1) has an unclassified title and (2) has a primary function of intelligence analysis, production, espionage, or counter-espionage. (A list of personnel within an overt support component -- described in PER 11-80 -- is unclassified unless another item of this guide applies.) (U) | C     | 15 yrs. review            | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| PER 11-80 |    | C     | 20 yrs. review            | Tabs Ac & B3           |

PER 11-80

25X1

*How many classified terms?**Why not count?**Why not classify also?**why not?**Secret?*

~~SECRET~~

PER

PERSONNEL/ORGANIZATION

|           |   | LEVEL | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-----------|---|-------|-------------------|------------------------|
| PER 12-80 | A substantially complete list of all overt Agency metropolitan space and numbers of personnel by component.<br>(U) <i>Only metropolitan?</i><br>(A9c3.11)   | C     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B3           |
| PER 13-80 | Information, such as that contained in the Staffing Complement Report, which substantively reveals either (1) the names and official titles of all CIA employees, or (2) the entire CIA organizational structure, numbers, and assignments, and locations of components and installations. (U)<br>(A9c4.3, WALSH) | TS    | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B3           |

*Can't be Secret*

*What does this mean?  
Do we clarify this info on net?*

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**SECRET****SECURITY****SEC**

|          |  | LEVEL | DURATION  | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|----------|--|-------|---|------------------------|
| SEC 1-80 | Information concerning procedures for checking incoming mail which, if divulged, would aid in circumventing those procedures. (U) <i>FOUO</i>  | C     | <i>10</i> yrs. review                                       | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| SEC 2-80 | Information correlating a badge with the code number required for valid entry through the computerized Security Access Control System. (U) <i>FOUO</i>   | C     | <i>Until</i> 6 yrs. or badge or code number is invalidated. | Tab Ac & B5            |
| SEC 3-80 | Information concerning the route, frequency, or mode of travel of courier runs which, if divulged, could lead to unauthorized access to classified material. (U)   | C     | <i>10</i> yrs. review                                       | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| SEC 4-80 | Information concerning counterterrorism activities or tactics such as vehicle armoring, alarms, security locks and devices, defensive driving techniques, countersurveillance procedures, or the issuance of firearms for the protection of personnel. (U) <i>FOUO</i> | C     | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| SEC 5-80 | Information concerning nonattributable security investigative methods. (U)   | C     | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B5           |
| SEC 6-80 | <i>pertaining to personnel and physical security information</i><br>Information of a counterintelligence nature used in personnel or physical security investigations which, if divulged, would impede or negate those investigations. (U)                             | S     | 20 yrs. review  | Tabs Ac & B5           |

**SECRET**



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## SECURITY

SEC

|  | LEVEL | DURATION | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|--|-------|----------|------------------------|
|--|-------|----------|------------------------|

|           |   |     |                |              |
|-----------|---|-----|----------------|--------------|
| SEC 7-80  | Information concerning the timing, location equipment, or methodology employed in a technical surveillance countermeasure (or its results) which, if divulged, would tend to aid in circumvention. (U) <i>Clarify</i>                       | S   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5 |
| SEC 8-80  | Information concerning the design, construction, and internal communications systems of intelligence facilities which, if divulged, could aid in their penetration. (U) <i>Clarify</i>  | S   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5 |
| SEC 9-80  | Information concerning physical security devices and techniques which, if divulged, could aid in the physical or electronic penetration of intelligence facilities. (U) <i>Clarify</i>  | S   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5 |
| SEC 10-80 | Information derived from surveys of overseas installations, including personal residences, reflecting their security posture and vulnerabilities. (U) <i>Clarify</i>  | S   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5 |
| SEC 11-80 | Security container surreptitious and forced entry techniques which, if divulged, could impede or negate this capability. (U) <i>why not Secret</i>  | S → | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5 |
| SEC 12-80 | Information concerning data processing access procedures or controls on classified data banks which, if divulged, could lead to unauthorized access to ADP systems. (U) <i>in use or being developed (including contractor ADP systems)</i> | S   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5 |

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

SEC

## SECURITY

|             |   | LEVEL | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|-------------|---|-------|----------------|------------------------|
| SEC 13.1-80 | Information that a specific <del>electrical</del> equipment which transmits or processes classified information:<br><br>(1) contains no security fault deficiencies or<br><br>(2) is not vulnerable to crypto-variable extraction or tampering/bugging attack. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, F7&8)   | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B(4&5)       |
| SEC 13.2-80 | The statement that cryptographic equipment may contain a security fault deficiency without mentioning specific equipment, type of deficiency, or effects. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, F3)  | C     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(4&5)   |
| SEC 13.3-80 | Information, without details, that a specific equipment which processes classified information:<br><br>(1) contains a security fault deficiency or<br><br>(2) is vulnerable to cryptovvariable extraction or tampering/bugging attack or<br><br>(3) (when the equipment is cryptographic) has a TEMPEST deficiency. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, F9&10/C, 8E2a) | S     | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(4&5)   |

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*why not combine w/  
commo section*

**SECRET**  
SECURITY

SEC

25X1

SEC 13.4-80

SEC 13.5-80

SEC 13.6-80

SEC 13.7-80

SEC 13.8-80



LEVEL

DURATION

CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) &  
B(4&5)

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) &  
B(4&5)

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) &  
B(4&5)

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) &  
B(4&5)

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) &  
B5

*Confidential & Combined*

**SECRET**

SECRET

SECURITY

SEC

SEC 13.9-80

LEVEL

DURATION

CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs Ac & B5

SEC 13.10-80

C

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) & B5

SEC 13.11-80

C

or the  
highest  
level  
of

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) & B5

classified  
info pro-  
cessed at  
the facility

SEC 13.12-80

C

or the  
highest  
level of

20 yrs.  
review

Tabs A(c&e) & B5

classified  
info pro-  
cessed at  
the facility

SECRET

**SECRET**

SECURITY

SEC

|                   |  | LEVEL   | DURATION       | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION      |
|-------------------|--|---|----------------|-----------------------------|
| SEC 13.13-80      | Information about security faculty deficiencies in a specific equipment; specific unremedied weakness of cryptographic equipment or their functions within a system, including vulnerabilities to cryptanalysis, TEMPEST exploitation, tampering bugging, or key extraction. (U) <i>FOUO</i><br>(NACSI 4003A F4, F13)                | TS  | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B(4 and/or 5) |
| 25X1 SEC 13.14-80 | <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 30px; width: 100%;"></div>  | C   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs Ac & B5                |
| SEC 13.15-80      | Information indicating the U.S. Government's national level policies, programs, responsibilities, or resources for the control of compromising emanations. (U)<br>(NACSI 4003A, 8C)  | C   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5            |
| SEC 13.16-80      | Information indicating the Agency's policies, programs, responsibilities, or resources for the control of compromising emanations. (U)   | C   | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5            |
| SEC 13.17-80      | Test results, or other information which indicates that a facility or a specific operational system which processes classified information has a TEMPEST vulnerability which <del>provides information concerning keying variables.</del> (U) <i>Compromises plain text or final key.</i><br>(NACSI 4003A, 8D1) <i>a</i> <i>FOUO</i> | <del>TS</del><br>or<br>the<br>highest<br>level of<br>classified<br>info pro-<br>cessed by<br>the<br>facility<br>or system | 20 yrs. review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5            |

*Classified documents*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

SECURITY

SEC

25X1

SEC 13.18-80

SEC 13.19-80

SEC 13.20-80

SEC 13.21-80

SEC 13.22-80



| LEVEL | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION  |
|-------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| TS    | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B5     |
| S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & b5            |
| S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B(4&5) |
| C     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5        |
| TS    | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5        |

*Handwritten signature or initials, possibly "D. J. ..."*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

SEC

SECURITY

SEC 13.23-80

SEC 13.24-80

SEC 13.25-80

| LEVEL | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION  |
|-------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| C     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B5     |
| S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B5            |
| C     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B(4&5) |

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

SECURITY

SEC

|              | LEVEL | DURATION          | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION  |
|--------------|-------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| SEC 13.26-80 | C     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B(4&5) |
| SEC 13.27-80 | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) & B5        |
| SEC 13.28-80 | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B5     |
| SEC 13.29-80 | S     | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs A(c&e) &<br>B5     |

*Confidential*  
**SECRET**



**SECRET**

SECURITY

SEC 14-80

A safe or lock combination when coupled with information identifying the lock or the location of the device to which the lock is affixed. (U)  
(A9c2.25)

| LEVEL   | DURATION                                | CRITERIA/JUSTIFICATION |
|---|---|------------------------|
| Classify in accordance with the classification of the material the safe or lock protects or is authorized to protect, whichever is higher.<br>(Normally TS) | 6 yrs. or until combination is changed. | Tab Ac                 |

SEC 15-80

Information detailing emergency relocation plans. (U)  
(AISM 28)

|                |                   |              |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| TS<br>D9.5 yrs | 20 yrs.<br>review | Tabs Ac & B5 |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------|

*To this all that we will classify about recently when it comes to SEC?*

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FEB 4 1982

## NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Order \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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EXECUTIVE ORDER \_\_\_\_\_  
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

This Order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information. It recognizes that it is essential that the public be informed concerning the activities of its Government, but that the interests of the United States and its citizens require that certain information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Nothing in this Order limits the protection afforded any information by other provisions of law.

PART I

ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION

SECTION 1.1 Classification Levels.

(a) National security information (hereinafter "classified information") shall be classified at one of the following three levels:

(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to

cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify classified information.

(c) If there is reasonable doubt either about the need to classify information or about which classification level is appropriate, the information shall be considered classified and shall be safeguarded as required for the higher level of classification under the provisions of this Order pending a final determination by an original classification authority.

SEC 1.2

Classification Authority.

(a) Top Secret. The authority to classify information originally as Top Secret may be exercised only by:

(1) the President;

(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal Register; and

(3) officials delegated this authority under Section 1.2(d).

(b) Secret. The authority to classify information originally as Secret may be exercised only by:

(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal Register;

(2) officials with original Top Secret classification authority; and

(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).

(c) Confidential. The authority to classify information originally as Confidential may be exercised only by:

(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal Register;

(2) officials with original Top Secret or Secret classification authority; and

(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section 1.2(d).

(d) Delegation of Original Classification Authority.

(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this Order. Agency heads are responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.

(2) Original Top Secret classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official

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designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a)(2); and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), provided that official has been delegated original Top Secret classification authority by the agency head.

(3) Original Secret classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to Sections 1.2(a)(2) and 1.2(b)(1); an official with original Top Secret classification authority; and the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), provided that official has been delegated original Secret classification authority by the agency head.

(4) Original Confidential classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1) and 1.2(c)(1), an official with original Top Secret classification authority; and the senior official designated under Section 5-301(a), provided that official has been delegated original Secret

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or Confidential classification authority by the agency head.

(5) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and shall not be delegated except as provided in this Order. It shall identify the official delegated the authority by name or position title. Delegated classification authority includes the authority to classify information at the level granted and lower levels of classification.

(e) Exceptional Cases. When an employee, contractor, licensee, or grantee of an agency that does not have original classification authority originates information believed by that person to require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with this Order and its implementing directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this Order or its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to this information. That agency shall decide within thirty (30) days whether to classify this information. If it is not



clear which agency has classification responsibility for this information, it shall be sent to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. The Director shall determine the agency having primary subject matter interest and forward the information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a classification determination.

SEC 1.3 Classification Categories.

(a) Information shall be considered for classification if it concerns:

- (1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- (2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- (3) foreign government information;
- (4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

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(5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

(6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;

(7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

(8) cryptology;

(9) a confidential source; or

(10) other categories of information that are related to the national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President or by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated original classification authority by the President. Any determination made under this subsection shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(b) Information that is determined to concern one or more of the categories in Section 1.3(a)

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shall be classified when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

(c) Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security.

(d) Information classified in accordance with Section 1.3 shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar information.

SEC 1.4 Duration of Classification.

(a) Information shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations. When it can be determined, a specific date or event for declassification shall be set by the original classification authority at the time the information is originally classified.

(b) Automatic declassification determinations under predecessor orders shall remain valid unless the classification is extended by an authorized official of the originating agency. These extensions may be by individual documents or categories of information. The agency shall be responsible for notifying holders of the information of such extensions.

(c) Information classified under predecessor orders and marked for declassification review shall remain classified until reviewed for declassification under the provisions of this Order.

SEC 1.5 Identification and Markings.

(a) At the time of original classification, the following information shall be shown on the face of all classified documents, or clearly associated with other forms of classified information in a manner appropriate to the medium involved, unless this information itself would reveal a confidential source or relationship not otherwise evident in the document or information:

- (1) the identity of the original classification authority if other than the person whose name appears as the approving or signing official;
- (2) the agency and office of origin;
- (3) the date or event for declassification, or the notation "Originating Agency's Determination Required"; and
- (4) one of the three classification levels defined in Section 1.1.

(b) Each classified document transmitted outside the originating agency shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are not classified. Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and revoke waivers of this requirement for specified classes of documents or information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be notified of any waivers.

(c) Marking designations implementing the provisions of this Order, including abbreviations, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued by the Information Security Oversight Office.

(d) Foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a United States classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information.

(e) Information assigned a level of classification under predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Omitted markings may be inserted on a document by the officials specified in Section 3.1(b).

SEC 1.6 Limitations on Classification.

(a) In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or

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delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

(b) The President or an agency head or official designated under Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1), or 1.2(c)(1) may re-classify information previously declassified and disclosed if it is determined in writing that (1) the information requires protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information may reasonably be recovered.

(c) Information may be classified or re-classified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of this Order (Section 3.4) if such classification meets the requirements of this Order and is accomplished personally and on a document-by-document basis by the agency head, the deputy agency head, the senior agency official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1), or an official with original Top Secret classification authority.

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## PART 2

### DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

#### SEC 2.1 Use of Derivative Classification.

(a) Derivative classification is (1) the determination that information is in substance the same as information currently classified, and (2) the application of the same classification markings. Persons who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide, need not possess original classification authority.

(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:

(1) observe and respect original classification decisions; and

(2) carry forward to any newly created documents any assigned authorized markings. The declassification date or event that provides the longest period of



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classification shall be used for documents  
classified on the basis of multiple sources.

SEC 2.2 Classification Guides.

(a) Agencies with original classification  
authority shall prepare classification guides to  
facilitate the proper and uniform derivative  
classification of information.

(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and  
in writing by an official who:

(1) has program or supervisory  
responsibility over the information or is the  
senior agency official designated under  
Section 5.3(a)(1); and

(2) is authorized to classify information  
originally at the highest level of  
classification prescribed in the guide.

(c) Agency heads may, for good cause, grant and  
revoke waivers of the requirement to prepare  
classification guides for specified classes of  
documents or information. The Director of the

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Information Security Oversight Office shall be notified of any waivers.

### PART 3

#### DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING

SEC 3.1 Declassification Authority.

(a) Information shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national security considerations permit. Agencies shall coordinate their review of classified information with other agencies that have a direct interest in the subject matter. Information that continues to meet the classification requirements prescribed by Section 1.3 despite the passage of time will continue to be protected in accordance with this Order.

(b) Information shall be declassified or downgraded by the official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position; the originator's successor; a supervisory official of either; or officials delegated such authority in writing by

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the agency head or the senior agency official designated pursuant to Section 5.3(a)(1).

(c) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that information is classified in violation of this Order, the Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that originated the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The information shall remain classified until the appeal is decided.

(d) The provisions of this Section shall apply to agencies that, under the terms of this Order, do not have original classification authority, but that had such authority under predecessor orders.

SEC      3.2      Transferred Information.

(a) In the case of classified information transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this Order.

(b) In the case of classified information that is not officially transferred as described in Section 3.2(a), but that originated in an agency that has ceased to exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession of such information shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this Order. Such information may be declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession after consultation with any other agency that has an interest in the subject matter of the information.

(c) Classified information transferred to the General Services Administration for accession into the National Archives of the United States shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist of the United States in accordance with this Order, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, and agency guidelines.

### 3.3 Systematic Review for Declassification

(a) The Archivist of the United States shall, in accordance with procedures prescribed in the Information Security Oversight Office's directives implementing this Order, systematically review for declassification (1)

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classified records accessioned into the National Archives of the United States, and (2) classified presidential papers or records in the Archivist's possession and control. Such information shall be reviewed by the Archivist for declassification in accordance with systematic review guidelines that shall be provided by agency heads who originated the information, or in the case of foreign government information, by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office in consultation with interested agency heads.

(b) Agency heads may conduct internal systematic review programs for classified information originated by their agencies contained in records determined by the Archivist to be permanently valuable but that have not been accessioned into the National Archives of the United States.

(c) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of

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classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods.

SEC 3.4 Mandatory Review for Declassification.

(a) Except as provided in Section 3.4(b), all information classified under this Order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassification by the originating agency, if:

(1) the request is made by a United States citizen or permanent resident alien, a federal agency, or a State or local government; and

(2) the request describes the document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort.

(b) Information originated by a President, the White House Staff, by committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the President, or others specifically providing advice and counsel to a President or acting on behalf of a President,

including such information in the possession and control of the Administrator of General Services pursuant to sections 2107, 2107 note, or 2203 of title 44, United States Code, is exempted from the provisions of Section 3.4(a). The Archivist of the United States shall have authority to review and declassify such information. Review procedures developed by the Archivist shall provide for consultation with agencies having primary subject matter interest and shall be consistent with the provisions of applicable laws or lawful agreements that pertain to the respective presidential papers or records. Any decision by the Archivist may be appealed to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. Agencies with primary subject matter interest shall be notified promptly of the Director's decision on such appeals and may further appeal to the National Security Council. The information shall remain classified until the appeal is decided.

(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for declassification shall declassify information no longer requiring protection under this Order. They shall release this information unless

withholding is otherwise authorized under applicable law.

(d) Agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for the mandatory review of classified information. These procedures shall apply to information classified under this or predecessor orders. They shall also provide a means for administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review request.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the review of cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall develop special procedures for the review of information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods, after consultation with affected agencies. The Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of information accessioned into the National Archives of the United States.

(f) In response to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of this Order:



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(1) An agency shall refuse to confirm or deny the existence or non-existence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or non-existence is itself classifiable under this Order.

(2) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custody that were classified by another agency, it shall refer copies of the request and the requested documents to the originating agency for processing, and may, after consultation with the originating agency, inform the requester of the referral. In cases in which the originating agency determines in writing that a response under Section 3.4(f)(1) is required, the referring agency shall respond to the requester in accordance with that Section.

#### PART 4

#### SAFEGUARDING

SEC 4.1 General Restrictions on Access.

(a) A person is eligible for access to classified information provided that a formal determination of trustworthiness has been made by agency heads or designated senior officials and provided that such access is essential to the accomplishment of authorized and lawful Government purposes.

(b) Controls shall be established by each agency to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed only under conditions that will provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons.

(c) Classified information shall not be disseminated outside the executive branch except under conditions that ensure that the information will be given protection equivalent to that afforded within the executive branch.

(d) Except as provided by directives issued by the President through the National Security Council, classified information originating in one agency may not be disseminated outside any other agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency.

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This Section shall not be construed as reducing the authority of the Attorney General, with the advice of appropriate agency heads and subject to review by the President, to determine if the use of classified information is required to support legal proceedings. For purposes of this Section, the Department of Defense shall be considered one agency.

SEC 4.2 Special Access Programs.

(a) Agency heads designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a) may create special access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information classified pursuant to this Order or predecessor orders. Such programs may be created or continued only at the written direction of these agency heads. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities but not including military operational strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources or methods, this function will be exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence. For special access programs pertaining to cryptology, this function will be exercised by the Secretary of Defense.

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(b) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, consistent with the provisions of Section 5.2(b)(4) shall have non-delegable access to all such accountings.

SEC 4.3 Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees.

(a) The requirement in Section 4.1(a) that access to classified information may be granted only as is essential to the accomplishment of authorized and lawful Government purposes may be waived as provided in Section 4.3(b) for persons who:

(1) are engaged in historical research projects, or

(2) previously have occupied policy-making positions to which they were appointed by the President.

(b) Waivers under Section 4.3(a) may be granted only if the originating agency:

(1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of national security;

(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this Order; and

(3) limits the access granted to former presidential appointees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a presidential appointee.

## PART 5

### IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

SEC      5.1      Policy Direction.

(a) The National Security Council shall provide overall policy direction for the information security program.

(b) The Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for implementing and monitoring the program established pursuant to this Order. The Administrator shall delegate the implementation and monitorship functions of this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

SEC      5.2      Information Security Oversight Office.

(a) The Information Security Oversight Office shall have a full-time Director appointed by the Administrator of General Services subject to approval by the President. The Director shall have the authority to appoint a staff for the Office.

(b) The Director shall:

(1) develop, in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate, subject to the approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of this Order which shall be binding on the agencies;

(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this Order and implementing directives;

(3) review all agency implementing regulations and agency guidelines for systematic declassification review. The Director shall require any regulation or guideline to be changed if it is not consistent with this Order or implementing directives. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The agency regulation or guideline shall remain in effect until the appeal is decided;

(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of the information security program of each agency that generates or handles classified information and to require of each agency those reports, information, and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill the Director's responsibilities. If these reports, inspections, or access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the

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affected agency head or the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) may deny access. The Director may appeal denials to the National Security Council. The denial of access shall remain in effect until the appeal is decided;

(5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate, recommend presidential approval;

(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the information security program;

(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies, standard forms that will promote the implementation of the information security program;

(8) exercise case-by-case classification authority in accordance with Section 1.2(e);



(9) report at least annually to the President through the National Security Council on the implementation of this Order; and

(10) have the authority to convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the information security program.

SEC 5.3 General Responsibilities.

(a) Agencies that originate or handle classified information shall:

(1) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer its information security program, which shall include an active oversight and security education program to ensure effective implementation of this Order;

(2) promulgate implementing regulations. Any unclassified regulations that establish agency information security policy shall be published or incorporated by reference in the Federal Register to the extent that

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these regulations affect members of the public;

(3) establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures that (i) require that a demonstrable need for access to classified information is established before initiating administrative clearance procedures, and (ii) ensure that the number of persons granted access to classified information is limited to the minimum consistent with operational and security requirements and needs; and

(4) develop special contingency plans for the protection of classified information used in or near hostile or potentially hostile areas.

SEC 5.4 Sanctions.

(a) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office finds that a violation of this Order or its implementing directives may have occurred, the Director shall make a report to the head of the agency or to the senior official

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designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) so that corrective steps, if appropriate, may be taken.

(b) Officers and employees of the United States Government, and its contractors, licensees, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they:

(1) knowingly, willfully, or negligently disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under this Order or predecessor orders;

(2) knowingly and willfully classify or continue the classification of information in violation of this Order or any implementing directive; or

(3) knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of this Order or implementing directive.

(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information or other sanction in

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accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.

(d) Each agency head or the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1) shall ensure that appropriate and prompt corrective action is taken whenever a violation under Section 5.4(b) occurs. Either shall ensure that the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office is promptly notified whenever a violation under Section 5.4(b)(1) or (2) occurs.

## PART 6

### GENERAL PROVISIONS

#### SEC 6.1 Definitions.

(a) "Agency" has the meaning provided at 5 U.S.C. 552(e).

(b) "Information" means any information or material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by, produced for, or is under the control of the United States Government.

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(c) "National security information" means information that has been determined pursuant to this Order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated.

(d) "Foreign government information" means:

(1) information provided by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence; or

(2) any information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or organization of governments, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, be held in confidence.

(e) "National security" means the national defense and/or foreign relations of the United States.

(f) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information or relationship, or both, be held in confidence.

(g) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with a classification designation signifying the level of protection required.

SEC 6.2 General.

(a) Nothing in this Order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act.

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(b) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall personally or through authorized representatives of the Department of Justice render an interpretation of this Order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.

(c) Executive Order No. 12065 of June 28, 1978; the accompanying presidential Order of June 28, 1978; Information Security Oversight Office Implementing Directive No. 1 of October 2, 1978; and Section 5-209 of Executive Order No. 12148 of July 20, 1979, are revoked as of the effective date of this Order.

(d) This Order shall become effective on \_\_\_\_\_.

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|---|----------|-----------|-----------|
| TRANSMITTAL SLIP  |          | DATE      | 9 Feb. 82 |
| TO:   |          |           |           |
| ROOM NO.  | BUILDING |           |           |
| 1236  | Ames     |           |           |
| REMARKS:  |          |           |           |
| <p>Here's the latest draft -</p> <p>Replied to <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p> <p>16 Feb 82, that CRD has no problems with this version.</p> <p>File: Revision of E.O. 12065</p> |          |           |           |
| FROM:   |          |           |           |
| ROOM NO.  | BUILDING | EXTENSION |           |
|   |          |           |           |

FORM NO. 241  
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REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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